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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written concerning habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the
Great Writ, a basic safeguard against unlawful detention.' This Article traces
the highlights in the expansion and contraction of federal habeas corpus and
attempts to show how social change has influenced the reach of the writ.
Although the development of federal habeas corpus law seemingly re-
flects changes in the personality of the Supreme Court over time, societal
attitudes of each period in our history often underlie both the Court's pro-
nouncements and the actions of Congress. 2 Alphaeus Thomas Mason ob-
served several years ago that "[j]udicial decisions range widely under the
impact of various pressures. They [do not] represent ... a soulless, mechan-
ical choice of alternatives." 3 More recently, former Justice Potter Stewart, in
an interview, expressed the view that critics and supporters of the Supreme
Court sometimes "attribute ... too much ' 4 to it; that the decisions of the
Court merely "have reflected the changes in American society." 5 Even be-
fore Roscoe Pound's admonition in 1906 against mechanical jurisprudence,6
dynamic episodes in legal development had occurred in which the social
environment of the time shaped the course of the law. This Article explores
this phenomenon in the context of the growth and decline of federal habeas
corpus.
II. THE COLONIAL ERA
William Penn and William Meade were tried in 1670 in Old Bailey,
London, for participating in a Quaker worship. They could not possibly have
imagined the impact that their jury trial would ultimately have on the writ of
habeas corpus in the still unformed American nation. The repeated refusal of
Edward Bushell, foreman of the jury, and his fellow jurors to permit the court
to dictate a guilty verdict led to the jurors' imprisonment. Eight of the jurors
paid fines to purchase freedom; Bushell rejected this form of release and
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1. This Article is concerned with custody arising out of criminal conviction and sentence by a court of law.
Detention can also occur in many other contexts, in which the scope of judicial inquiry may differ.
2. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), Justice Brennan noted that "[all the significant statutory changes
in the federal writ have been prompted by grave political crises." Id. at 401 n.9.
3. Mason, Free Government's Balance Wheel, WILSON Q., Spring 1977, at 93, 94.
4. Justice Potter Stewart: An Interview Reflecting on the Court, NAT'L L.J., July 12, 1982, at 11, 21.
5. Id.
6. R. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (address to the
American Bar Association, Aug. 29, 1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
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eventually won his liberty, after many weeks of incarceration,7 by the first
writ of habeas corpus issued by a court of common pleas. 8 England's most
noted lawyers argued in Bushell's behalf before the Lord Chief Justice of
England and his eleven associates, who decided that jurors must be free to
return verdicts upon the evidence, uncoerced by the court. 9
Penn published a complete account of these events 10 that received note-
worthy attention in the American colonies. " By the time the federal constitu-
tion was adopted, many colonists had claimed a common-law right to the writ
of habeas corpus. 2 This claim received legitimation in colonial charters and
later in state legislation that adopted in substance the English Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679. 3 Some of the colonies further legitimized the writ by adopting
various constitutional provisions either explicitly guaranteeing the availability
of the writ or prohibiting its suspension. 4
Nonetheless, the inclusion of a habeas corpus provision in the federal
constitution provoked considerable debate.15 Although declining to incorpo-
rate in the Constitution an affirmative guarantee of the writ, the convention
delegates adopted a provision barring the writ's suspension. 6 Considerable
historical basis demonstrated the need for that suspension clause: the English
Parliament had frequently suspended the writ during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, thereby permitting confinement without indictment,
bail, or other judicial process. 17 Parliament suspended even the historic
Habeas Corpus Act, adopted in 1679, because of conspiracies against the
King in 1688 and 1696. 18 A number of suspensions in the eighteenth century
followed, including one prompted by the American revolution.' 9 It is highly
likely that these events had left their imprint in the minds of the colonists. As
7. Bushell's Case, 6 Howell's State Trials 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670); see H. WILDES, WILLIAM
PENN 65-67 (1974).
8. Lehman, Gentlemen of the Jury, LIBERTY, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 20, 22.
9. Bushell's Case, 6 Howell's State Trials 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670); see H. FANTEL, WILLIAM
PENN: APOSTLE OF DISSENT 127-28 (1974).
10. See Harvey, Penn, The Religious Leader, in TRIBUTES TO WILLIAM W. PENN: A TERCENTENARY
RECORD, 1644-1944, at 35 (1946). See generally W. PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE
ONCE MORE BRIEFLY DEBATED (1670).
11. See, e.g., White, Penn, the Statesman, in TRIBUTES TO WILLIAM W. PENN: A TERCENTENARY
RECORD, 1644-1944, at 50 (1946).
12. See W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 95-125 (1980); see also Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405 (1963).
13. English Habeas Corpus Act, 1679,31 Car. 2, ch. 2; see W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
HABEAS CORPUS 95-125 (1980).
14. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution contained an affirmative provision for the writ and also
barred its suspension except on "the most urgent and pressing occasions." MASS. CONST. ch. 6, art. VII, § 98.
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 contained similar provisions, N.H. CONST. art. 91, and the Georgia
Constitution also incorporated principles of habeas corpus, GA. CONST. art. 1, § I, XII. See Collings, Habeas
Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 341 n.34 (1952).
15. See W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 128-31 (1980).
16. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
17. See Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L.
REV. 335, 339 (1952).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 329 n.26.
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a result the delegates at the Constitutional Convention were concerned about
the possibility of the central government's suspending state habeas corpus
over federal prisoners. 20 This concern of several of the colonies and a number
of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, especially Charles Pinkney,
also led to the enactment of a specific provision in section 14 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, affirmatively granting courts of the United States power to issue
writs of habeas corpus.
2
'
Although Thomas Jefferson criticized the framers of the Constitution for
not specifically setting forth affirmative habeas corpus provisions, 22 ironical-
ly, Jefferson's administration made the first effort in the new Republic to
suspend the writ. Jefferson had committed himself to destroying Aaron Burr's
political career, and suspension of the writ became part of the plan. Jefferson
desired to prevent issuance of the writ in behalf of Dr. Justus E. Bollman and
Samuel Swartwout, two dispatch-bearers for Burr who were charged with
treason, as, ultimately, was Burr himself.23 Bollman and Swartwout had
been seized in New Orleans at the direction of General Wilkinson, com-
mander of the Army of the United States. They were denied counsel and
access to the courts. Pursuant to Wilkinson's orders, Bollman and Swartwout
were transported on board a warship to Washington, D.C., for delivery to the
President. Upon arrival in the capital they remained in a military prison while
Congress debated the suspension of the habeas corpus writ. 24 Chief Justice
Marshall finally released them on such a writ.25
Except for this episode, the writ enjoyed an uneventful history during
this period. The great concerns of Americans were agriculture, commerce,
and perceived injustices engendered within the states pertaining to contract
and property rights.26
20. After carefully analyzing contemporary commentary on the suspension clause, as well as considering
its location in the Constitution, the relevant history, and the records of the state constitutional conventions,
William F. Duker argued persuasively "that the framers intended the clause only to restrict Congressional
power to suspend state habeas for federal prisoners." W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS 126 (1980).
21. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat 73, 81. Section 14 also provided that Justices of the Supreme
Court, as well asjudges of the district courts, shall have the power to grant the writ for the purpose of inquiring
into the cause of the commitment "Ip]rovided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners
in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are
committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into a court to testify." Id. at
82.
22. See W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 133 n.52 (1980) (citing 5 WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 493 (Ford ed. 1904)).
23. See 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 343-52 (1919).
24. In the House debate over the suspension, John Randolph vigorously criticized the attempt to suspend
the writ, arguing that the Declaration of Independence had assailed the kind of wrongs "suffered by Bollman
and Swartwout 'as one of the grievances imposed by the British government on the colonies. Now, it is done
under the Constitution,' exclaimed Randolph, 'and under a republican administration, and men are transported
without the color of law, nearly as far as across the Atlantic.' "" Id. at 360 (quoting 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 537-38
(1807)).
25. Ex parte Bollman and Ex parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
26. See H. HOCKETT, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OFTHE UNITED STATES, 1492-1828, at 177-78
(1927); see also J.F. JAMESON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 52-64
(1957).
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For much of the first century following the enactment of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, federal habeas corpus was limited to petitions filed by persons in
the custody of the United States. In 1845, in Ex parte Dorr,27 the Court ruled
that it lacked the power to issue the writ to a prisoner under sentence of a
state court. The Court described the proviso in section 14 as "unambiguous"
in placing "beyond the power of federal courts and judges [individuals] in
custody under the authority of a state."-28 Even when a federal prisoner
brought the application for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court would
never inquire into the underlying indictment or into the justness of the convic-
tion, but would look only into the very narrow issue whether the convicting
court had jurisdiction. 29 The federal courts held that habeas corpus afforded
no relief to an individual incarcerated pursuant to a judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction. 0
Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus, unfortunately the Act failed to define the term
"habeas corpus" and to set forth the procedure for granting the writ. The
Supreme Court ultimately construed the habeas provisions of the Act accord-
ing to the common-law writ. In Ex parte Bollman3" Chief Justice Marshall
observed that although the power to issue the writ depended on statute, "for
the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to
the common law. 3
2
Inevitably, our dual system of government was bound to produce conflict
between the states and the federal government, and in 1833 Congress found
itself compelled to expand the writ because of a jurisdictional conflict with
state courts. Federal marshals attempting to enforce a federal tariff, the so-
called "Tariff of Abominations," underwent the humiliating and unpleasant
experience of imprisonment under orders of state courts in the South.3
Congress responded by making habeas corpus available to federal officers in
state custody for acts committed in furtherance of federal law. 4
Congress again expanded the reach of the writ in 1842, in response to
international tensions emanating from the Canadian rebellion in 1837-1838. 35
These tensions developed when New York State indicted a British citizen for
the destruction of an American-owned ship that had been lending support to
rebellious forces in Canada.3 6 When Britain called upon our federal govern-
ment for the immediate release of the prisoner, the United States responded
27. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
28. Id. at 105.
29. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
30. See, e.g., id. at 202-03; E parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822).
31. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
32. Id. at 93-94.
33. Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HARV. L. REV. 657, 658
(1948).
34. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (1976)).
35. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539.
36. W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS COReUS 188 (1980).
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that its interposition would be improper because the alleged offense had been
committed within the jurisdiction of the State of New York.37 Congress'
subsequent extension of the writ made it available to subjects or citizens of
foreign governments who were detained under state or federal authority for
acts done pursuant to the law of a foreign sovereign.
III. THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD
Perhaps the most dramatic and significant development in the federal writ
of habeas corpus came with congressional enactment of the Act of February
5, 1867.38 In this legislation Congress markedly extended the historic bounda-
ries of the writ by making it available to "any person.., restrained of his or
her liberty in violation of the constitution ... or law of the United States." 3 9
The Act thereby overruled Ex parte Dorr40 and significantly extended the
power to issue the writ in behalf of state prisoners. The Act also made a major
change in habeas corpus procedure by providing that petititoners for the writ
"may deny any of the material facts set forth in the return, or may allege any
fact.", 4 ' Thus, the habeas court was now empowered to conduct an inquiry
into the facts underlying the detention and was no longer limited to bare legal
review. These wide-reaching changes ultimately became the basis for the
development of modern federal habeas law, although neither their full impact
nor their potential was felt until the twentieth century.
When one considers the suspicion with which much of the citizenry
during the colonial period viewed the doctrine of federalism, and the tensions
that had already surfaced between the states and the federal government, the
Act of 1867 seems a startling piece of legislation. The Act, however, did not
suddenly evolve in a flash of brilliance, as Minerva sprung forth from the head
of Jupiter. Its genesis lay in the dramatic and extensive changes wrought in
the South by the Civil War and the Reconstruction Acts. Despite ratification
of the thirteenth amendment in 1865,42 some of the state legislatures that
voted for the amendment took measures to undermine it in the years that
37. Id. at 188-89.
38. Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. This Act provided inter alia that the federal courts and judges
in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or
of any treaty or law of the United States .... The petitioner may deny any of the material facts set
forth in the return, or may allege any fact to show that the detention is in contravention of the
constitution or laws of the United States, which allegations or denials should be on oath .... The said
court or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing testimony
and the arguments of the parties interested, and if it shall appear that the petitioner is deprived of his or




40. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845). See supra text accompanying note 27.
41. See supra note 36.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist
within the United States... "
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followed. Racial conflicts continued, and "the South did not fear to show that
in spirit it was neither broken nor contrite.-
43
Congressional investigations at the time 44 revealed that "despite a
theoretical improvement in legal status, Negroes remained virtually unpro-
tected by State criminal processes.- 45 After taking extensive testimony, the
Joint Congressional Committee on Reconstruction reported in the winter of
1866 that emancipated slaves were subjected to acts of "cruelty, oppression
and murder, which the local authorities were at no pains to prevent or
punish." 
46
Addressing the Senate one year after the Act was passed, Senator
Trumbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, commented on the
purpose of the Act:
The act of 1867 was not the first act which authorized writs of habeas corpus to be
issued by the United States courts. The act of 1789 authorized the issuing of all
such writs in cases where persons were deprived of their liberty under authority or
color of authority of the United States. Why, then, was the act of 1867 passed? It
was passed to authorize writs of habeas corpus to issue in cases where persons
were deprived of their liberty under State laws or pretended State laws. It was the
object of the act of 1867 to confer jurisdiction on the United States courts in cases
not before provided for, and it was to meet a class of cases which was arising in the
rebel States, where, under pretense of certain State laws, men made free by the
Constitution of the United States were virtually being enslaved, and it was also
applicable to cases in the State of Maryland where, under an apprentice law,
freedmen were being subjected to a species of bondage. The object was to author-
ize a habeas corpus in those cases to issue from the United States courts, and to be
taken on appeal to the Supreme Court.47
Senator Trumbull had reported to the Senate in July 1866 on House Bill
No. 605.48 He explained that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had limited the habeas
corpus jurisdiction of the United States courts to persons who were held
under United States laws. Discussing the purpose of the proposed Act,
Senator Trumbull emphasized:
43. J. HICKS, THE AMERICAN NATION 21 (3d ed. 1955).
44. On January 8, 1866, Chairman Wilson of the House Judiciary Committee introduced a bill to secure the
habeas corpus writ to persons held in slavery or involuntary servitude. Wilson's bill was referred to the
Judiciary Committee with comment from Representative Smith stressing the "great importance" of the measure
to many persons in his state. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1866). Although this bill was never
reported out of the Committee, it does reflect some of the social and political motivations in Congress that
culminated in the passage of the Act of 1867. See Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court
as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 34 n.17 (1965).
45. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN
THE SOUTH 7 (1965).
46. Id. (quoting JOINT COMMITrEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. NO. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. vii, xvii (1866)).
47. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096 (1868).
48. Senator Johnson was concerned that the language of House Bill 605 would allow a federal judge in one
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a party in another jurisdiction. As a result Senator Trumbull
suggested an amendment to the Bill that restricted courts to issue writs of habeas corpus "within their respec-
tive jurisdictions." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 790 (1867). The Bill was passed into law with this
amendment. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
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Now, a person might be held under a State law in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and he ought to have in such case the benefit of the writ,
and we agree that he ought to have recourse to United States courts to show that
he was illegally imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States.49
In a debate several months later in the Senate, Senator Johnson pointed
out the breadth of the change:
Any man who may be imprisoned in any part of the United States may be brought
by this writ issued by a district judge of the United States farthest from the place of
imprisonment. I think that is exceedingly inconvenient, embarrassing, and expen-
sive and I do not see the necessity for it. I do not see why the authority should not
be limited to the circuit judge of the circuit where the party is imprisoned, or at
least the district judge within the same circuit. 50
Intentionally or not, the language was broad enough to give the federal courts
jurisdiction over all kinds of state prisoners, not merely federal agents or
foreign representatives detained by state authorities. Representative
Lawrence of Ohio, proponent of the Bill, characterized it on the floor of the
House as "a bill of the largest liberty."' In view of the objectives of the Act,
it is difficult to conceive how it could accomplish its purposes unless it en-
abled petitioners to seek habeas relief in federal courts should they be in-
carcerated or convicted of crime by states resisting the enforcement of the
thirteenth amendment or the Reconstruction Acts5 2 In this climate Congress
had little difficulty in enacting a habeas corpus statute that gave the federal
courts broad jurisdiction.5 3
Within a few months after the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court
applied it in Ex parte McCardle.54 In affirming the habeas jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Chase characterized the scope of the Act in
these words: "This legislation is of the most comprehensive character. It
brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge
every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitu-
tion, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction." 55
Almost a century later, when the scope of the writ reached the zenith of
49. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4229 (1866).
50. Id., 2d Sess. 730 (1867).
51. Id., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
52. Professor Lewis Mayers argues strenuously that the internal evidence in the drafting of the statute and
the available contemporary data provide no foundation for the Supreme Court's implication in Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391,410 (1963), that the 1867 Act was also aimed at implementing the fourteenth amendment. Mayers, The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 55-57 (1965). The
Act was passed prior to the fourteenth amendment.
53. In the following year Congress repealed the portion of the Act of 1867 that empowered the Supreme
Court to hear appeals from the denial of the writ by lower federal courts. See infra note 55.
54. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867).
55. Id. at 325-26. After this decision, and while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court,
Congress passed legislation withdrawing the Court's appellate jurisdiction over habeas cases. Act of Mar. 27,
1868, oh. 34, 15 Stat. 44; see also Es parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
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its expansion, Justice Brennan looked back at the Act of 1867 and described it
as
designed to furnish a method additional to and independent of direct Supreme
Court review of state court decisions for the vindication of the new constitutional
guarantees.... The elaborate provisions in the Act for taking testimony and
trying the facts anew in habeas hearings lend support to this conclusion, as does
the legislative history ....
Despite the expansion of habeas corpus jurisdiction in the federal courts
to make the writ available to state prisoners, the century-old notion that the
purpose of the writ was only to review the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
still persisted and impeded the application of the writ.17 The Supreme Court,
however, began, in Professor Henry Hart's words, "a long process of expan-
sion of the concept of a lack of 'jurisdiction.' 58 First, in Ex parte Lange59
the Court ordered the release of a federal prisoner who had twice been
sentenced, in violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy. 60 Al-
though the sentencing court had acted within its authority in convicting the
petitioner of a federal crime, the Supreme Court classified the case as one
including a defect in jurisdiction, reasoning that the sentencing court had
possessed jurisdiction to impose only a single sentence. Six years later, in
1879, the Court extended this theory in Ex parte Siebold,6' holding that a trial
court lacked jurisdiction when the defendant was charged under an unconsti-
tutional statute. The Court explained, "An unconstitutional law is void, and is
as no law." 63 In Ex parte Wilson64 the Court again applied a liberal interpreta-
tion of jurisdiction in granting the writ to a prisoner who had been convicted
without a grand jury indictment.
In these cases the Court had little difficulty viewing the habeas petitions
as bringing questions of jurisdiction that would fall within the traditional
scope of habeas corpus. But during this period the Court repeatedly reaf-
firmed its adherence to the traditional formulation of habeas jurisdiction by
refusing to grant the writ in cases in which errors in the conviction or the
indictment were alleged.65 Nevertheless, "Once the concept of 'jurisdiction'
56. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963).
57. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: Tire Time Chart of tre Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV.
84, 103-04 (1959).
58. Id. at 104.
59. 85 U.S. (18 Wail.) 163 (1873).
60. The defendant had previously been ordered to pay a fine and serve a year in prison, but this original
sentence had been vacated because it exceeded the maximum authorized punishment for the offense. Id. at 164.
61. Id. at 178.
62. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
63. Id. at 376.
64. 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
65. See In re Belt, 159 U.S. 95 (1895); Exparte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885); see also In re Moran, 203 U.S.
96 (1906). Professor Bator explains that -'[t]he strict jurisdictional test in fact continued to govern except in two
categories of cases: where the allegation was that the conviction was had under an unconstitutional statute, and
where the Court viewed the problem in terms of the illegality of the sentence rather than that of the judgment."




is taken beyond the question of the court's competence to deal with the class
of offenses charged and the person of the prisoner, it becomes a less than
luminous beacon." 66
IV. THE MODERN ERA
A. The Early Cases
The commencement of the modem era of habeas corpus may be traced to
the Court's historic decision in 1953 in the Brown v. Allen cases. 67 The stage
had been set for Brown v. Allen earlier in the century in two important
Supreme Court cases, Frank v. Mangum"s and Waley v. Johnston.69
Unlike Brown, which had its genesis in racial prejudice, Frank v.
Mangum arose from religious bias. Frank, a Jewish businessman in Atlanta,
had been convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a fourteen-year-
old girl.70 After the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction,1
Frank sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, alleging that the state
court had denied him due process under the fourteenth amendment because it
had allowed a mob to dominate his trial. Because of the prevailing concept
that jurisdictional defects limited the issuance of the writ, Frank argued that
mob conditions in and outside the courtroom had dominated the trial-even
compelling his and his counsel's absence when the jury returned the verdict-
to such an extent that the sentence and judgment were a nullity. 72 The district
court dismissed the habeas petition. 73
On appeal the Supreme Court held that if a mob had dominated the trial
and intimidated the jury, then Frank's federal claim under the fourteenth
amendment could be considered in determining the lawfulness of Frank's
incarceration. But if the State had supplied corrective process, then the peti-
tioner would not be entitled to habeas relief.74 The Government contended
that the defendant could not go outside the record to show loss of the trial
court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning
that since Congress could liberalize common-law procedure on habeas
corpus, a federal court could inquire into the substance of a state prisoner's
detention even if this required it to look beyond the record of his conviction to
test jurisdiction of the state court. 75 The Court, however, denied relief on the
ground that a competent state appellate court had accorded Frank "the fullest
66. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 470 (1963).
67. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The Court considered three separate cases in those appeals: Brown v. Allen,
Speller v. Allen, and Daniels v. Allen.
68. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
69. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
70. 237 U.S. 309, 311-12 (1915).
71. Id. at 312-14.
72. See id. at 312-16.
73. Id. at 311.
74. See id. at 335.
75. Id. at 331.
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right and opportunity to be heard according to the established modes and
procedures" 76 and had reviewed his federal claim fully and fairly. Although
the Frank Court effectively expanded federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over
state prisoners challenging their convictions on the basis of alleged federal
constitutional violations, it limited habeas relief to those constitutional claims
that had not been decided in the state courts. This rule prevailed for almost
forty years, but the claimant still had to frame the habeas corpus petition in
terms of constitutional errors that amounted to deprivation of jurisdiction. 7
Not until 1942, in Waley v. Johnston,78 did the Court discard the notion that a
jurisdictional defect was a necessary predicate for habeas relief.
Thus, by the time the Supreme Court heard Brown v. Allen, habeas
corpus law had broken away from the rigid restraints imposed by jurisdic-
tional review of constitutional errors. After Waley a habeas petitioner no
longer needed to base his complaint on defects in jurisdiction. The habeas
court was free to inquire into the circumstances of the state court proceedings
to determine whether the state court had protected the petitioner's constitu-
tional rights. It does not appear, however, that any of the pre-Brown cases
ever suggested that the habeas court could reconsider constitutional conten-
tions that had been fully litigated in state courts. Brown v. Allen, however, set
the stage for the dramatic surge of habeas corpus cases in the sixties, for it
permitted the challenge by federal habeas corpus of coerced confessions and
racial discrimination in jury selection even though state courts had reviewed
the merits of the constitutional claims.
B. Civil Rights Activity at Mid-Century
Cases like Brown v. Allen and its progeny, though representing major
advances in habeas corpus law, were profoundly influenced by societal
developments of the period. Congress had adopted the three post-Civil War
constitutional amendments79 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 80 almost a cen-
tury before, expressing a promise to blacks of equality and opportunity, both
political and economic. In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 187581 gave blacks
significant social rights to equal enjoyment of public accommodations, facili-
ties, transportation, and places of amusement. Yet the rising hopes engender-
ed by the constitutional amendments and legislation remained unfulfilled
decade after decade as blacks met with bitter opposition from state and
76. Id. at 345. The majority's position in Frank was later substantially repudiated in Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923), in an opinion by Justice Holmes, who had dissented in Frank. In Moore, a virtually identical
case, the Court held that the state court's superficial disposition of the constitutional issues was not entitled to
conclusive weight because the prisoners were not afforded sufficient corrective process. Under these circum-
stances the federal habeas court had a duty to inquire into the facts pertaining to the alleged due process
violation. Id. at 91-92.
77. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938).
78. 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).
79. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
80. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
81. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
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federal governments. Educational and employment opportunities remained
meager. When Southern whites returned to power after the Reconstruction
period, blacks were disenfranchised and once again relegated to a subordinate
status in American life.
82
The advent of the twentieth century worked little change in the rights or
opportunities afforded blacks. Our gallant struggle in World War I to make the
world safe for democracy provided few benefits for American blacks. By the
time World War II was upon us, little had been done to enforce existing laws
despite flagrant violations of blacks' civil rights.
The post-World War II period, however, became a turning point in the
realization of blacks' civil rights in this country. Our use of segregated mili-
tary forces to fight racism in Europe demonstrated the hypocrisy of our treat-
ment of blacks at home. Responding to widespread public sentiment, Presi-
dent Truman issued an executive order in 1948 that declared a presidential
policy requiring equality of treatment and opportunity in the armed services
for all persons, regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin.8 The war
also shifted public opinion toward more sympathetic consideration of blacks'
rights. The experiences of American troops in the Orient, South Pacific, and
Africa, the formation of the United Nations, and the attention drawn by
emerging nonwhite nations may have influenced American racial attitudes to
become more tolerant. "Against this background, the growing size of the
Northern Negro vote made civil rights a major issue in national elections." 85
In the meantime a national campaign waged by the NAACP against
educational segregation in the public schools of the South reached a "tri-
umphant climax" m in the 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of
Education.87 Ultimately, the campaign for civil rights led to the establishment
in 1957 of the Federal Civil Rights Commission, which had the power to
investigate discriminatory conditions and to recommend corrective
measures. 88 During this period sixty civil rights bills were introduced in the
House and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. These bills touched on
subjects ranging from antilynching, peonage, and crimes involving civil rights,
to voting and fair employment practices. 9 In a message to Congress on June
19, 1963, President Kennedy reminded his listeners of recent street demon-
strations by black citizens demanding equal access to public facilities and
accommodations29
82. See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 96-100 (1968) (hereinafter cited as NAT'L ADVISORY
COMM. REP.).
83. Id. at 101.
84. Exec. Order No. 9,981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-1948 Comp.).
85. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 82, at 105.
86. Id.
87. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 82, at 105.
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 291, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1966, 1966.
90. See S. REP. NO. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2355, 2363.
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The civil rights movement led to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965. 9' The legislative history of the Act 92 recites the "upsurge of public
indignation against the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the polls" that
had marked the past decade in certain regions of the country. 93
Around the same time, the attention of the Supreme Court was drawn to
serious deficiencies in the selection of juries in state trials of black criminal
defendants. Despite the well-established federal rule forbidding racial dis-
crimination in jury selection, as late as the mid-fifties blacks were being
systematically excluded from jury service. In 1948 the Supreme Court in
Brunson v. North Carolina94 reversed per curiam five state convictions be-
cause blacks had been intentionally excluded from juries on the basis of race.
The Court similarly reversed a murder conviction in Cassell v. Texas 95 be-
cause of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors who had indicted
a black petitioner. In this same period the Court reversed per curiam the
convictions of four blacks sentenced to death for rape in the sensational case
of Shepherd v. Florida96 because the method of jury selection discriminated
against blacks. In his concurrence Justice Jackson considered the jury selec-
tion issue only technical. He viewed the entire trial as a lamentable denial of
due process and "one of the best examples of one of the worst menaces to
American Justice. ' 97
It was becoming increasingly evident that in a large section of the nation
it was difficult, if not impossible, for a black person to obtain a fair trial that
comported with federal constitutional standards. This pattern of constitu-
tional violations undoubtedly impressed upon the Court the need for habeas
corpus reform. 98 The Court took its first step to remedy this pattern of abuses
in Brown v. Allen. 9
9
C. The Supreme Court Response
In Brown v. Allen and its companion cases, Daniels v. Allen and Speller
v. Allen, black state prisoners who had been sentenced to death sought a writ
of habeas corpus, claiming racial discimination in jury selection and challeng-
ing the admissibility of alleged coerced confessions.'o The federal district
court reviewed the record of the state proceedings, but also heard evidence
presented by the prosecution and defense. The court denied the writ, conclud-
91. Act of Sept. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
92. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2437.
93. Id. at 2440.
94. 333 U.S. 851 (1948).
95. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
96. 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
97. Id. at 55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
98. See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpas and the Court, 86 YALE
L.J. 1035 (1977).
99. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).




ing that the state trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence, that
the confessions were voluntary, and that the petitioners had not shown that
blacks had been systematically excluded from jury service solely because of
race. 101
The state courts had fully considered the same federal constitutional
issues raised in the habeas corpus proceedings. Nonetheless, on appeal the
Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to review of the consti-
tutional issues on habeas corpus and that a federal court could consider those
issues even if they had been fully reviewed on direct appeal.'02 The Court did
not disapprove of the district court's taking of additional evidence. Rather,
the Court believed this action was within the district court's discretion be-
cause it improved that court's ability to determine whether any fourteenth
amendment violation had occurred.' 3 The Court, however, observed that
when the state record is adequate and the federal habeas court is satisfied that
state courts have given fair consideration to federal constitutional rights, the
federal court may, absent unusual circumstances, dispense with a hearing.',4
Justice Frankfurter, in a separate majority opinion, stated that if it ap-
pears that the issue turns on basic facts which have been adjudicated against
the habeas petitioners, the federal court may accept the state court's factual
determination "[u]nless a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining
such facts in the State court."' 05 The primary majority opinion explains,
"Although they have the power, it is not necessary for federal courts to hold
hearings on the merits, facts or law a second time when satisfied that federal
constitutional rights have been protected." 106
Although opening habeas review to state prisoners desiring to relitigate
constitutional claims, the Court did not jettison all restrictions on the avail-
ability of the writ. In Daniels, a companion case to Brown, the Court declined
to permit a state prisoner to test a federal constitutional violation by using a
habeas corpus petition in lieu of an appeal.' 07 The Court refused habeas re-
view because a state procedural rule had barred the petitioner's untimely
appeal to the state courts.3 8 Nonetheless, the decision in Brown v. Allen and
the companion cases sharply expanded the scope of federal habeas corpus
relief. Henceforth, even when a petitioner did not show that the state courts
had failed to adequately consider his constitutional claims, the federal court
could inquire into those claims on habeas review. Moreover, the Brown
101. 344 U.S. 443, 454 (1953).
102. Id. at 457-58. The Court indicated tthat a United States District Court should give the usual weight
accorded under federal practice to the conclusions of state courts of last resort on federal constitutional issues,
but added that these conclusions were "not resjudicata." Id. at 458.
103. Id. at 478.
104. Id. at 463.
105. Id. at 506. (Frankfurter, J., separate majority opinion).
106. 344 U.S. 443, 464 (1953).
107. Id. at 485.
108. Id.
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opinion established a broad power in federal district courts to conduct evi-
dentiary hearings to redetermine the facts. 109 In essence, the focus of habeas
corpus had now shifted away from "the adequacy of the state's corrective
process or of the prisoner's personal opportunity to avail himself of this
process."" 0 Instead, the writ was transformed into a vehicle for testing the
fundamental correctness of the state court's decision with a view toward "the
avoidance in the end of any underlying constitutional error." "' In Justice
Frankfurter's words, state decisions "cannot, under the habeas corpus sta-
tute, be accepted as binding" on constitutional questions of law." 2 "The
State court," he explained, "cannot have the last say when it, though on fair
consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have mis-
conceived a federal constitutional right." "
3
In 1963, when the Court addressed Townsend v. Sain, ,"4 it acknowledged
the need to clarify the opinions in Brown v. Allen, because the lower federal
courts were reaching "widely divergent" and "often irreconcilable results"
in applying the principles of that case." 5 Because of its facts, Townsend
offered a particularly suitable opportunity for the Court to announce guide-
lines for habeas corpus hearings in the federal courts and to expand the
criteria for determining whether a de novo hearing should be conducted to
ascertain the primary facts surrounding an alleged constitutional violation.
Townsend, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, exhausted his
state remedies, including collateral review, and sought federal habeas
corpus.1 6 He claimed that he had been denied due process because of the
admission of a confession obtained while he was under the influence of a truth
serum drug administered by a police physician. The state court hearing did
not disclose whether the drug injected into Townsend could have induced him
to make statements that legally might be considered involuntary. This infor-
mation, vital in determining whether the confession had been a product of his
free will, had simply been omitted in the testimony of the medical expert,
through no fault of Townsend. "17 Despite conflicting evidence, the state court
had filed no opinion, conclusions of law, or findings of fact. Nevertheless, the
federal district court denied Townsend an opportunity to present evidence
109. Justice Jackson, in his concurrence, sharply denounced the Court's expansion of the scope of the writ.
He believed it would adversely affect federal-state relations and foresaw the redundancy problem that would
soon overtake the federal courts. He reminded the Court that the state chiefjustices had adopted a resolution in
November 1952 condemning the practice of new, independent hearings in federal habeas proceedings, express-
ing the view that a final judgment of a state's highest court should be subject to review only by the Supreme
Court of the United States. See id. at 534-48 (Jackson, I., concurring).
110. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV.
84, 106 (1959).
Ill. Id.
112. 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953).
113. Id. at 508.
114. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
115. Id. at 310.
116. Id. at 296.
117. Id. at 321.
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and dismissed the petition on the basis of its examination of the state court
record. " 
8
The Supreme Court, turning to the Act of 1867 as well as the history of
the writ and the Court's prior decisions, concluded that the power to relitigate
facts on federal habeas corpus is "plenary": "9 if the petition alleges facts
that, if proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the federal court has the
power to receive evidence and try the facts de novo. According to the Court,
the appropriate standard for the federal court to apply in cases in which the
facts are in dispute is whether the state court afforded the applicant a full and
fair evidentiary hearing, either at trial or on collateral review. 20 The Court
held that the power to hold a new evidentiary hearing must be exercised if
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the
state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered
evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court
hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 121
But if the federal court concludes that the state court provided the petitioner a
full and fair hearing and the findings are reliable, the district court may-and
ordinarily should-accept the state-found facts. It need not do so, however; in
its sound discretion and in any case, it may receive evidence bearing upon the
constitutional claim. "
Although the Court believed that the Brown standard was too general to
provide adequate guidance,'23 it reiterated a rule announced in Brown: when
the federal habeas court accepts the state's factual findings, it must apply
federal law to such findings independently and may not give binding weight on
habeas to the state conclusions of law. 2 4 The Court had no difficulty in
concluding that on the record in Townsend the district court must hold a
hearing. "5
Townsend's grant to federal district courts of broad authority to review
constitutional issues arising in state criminal convictions had a substantial
impact on traditional notions of federalism. Townsend dramatically extended
the Brown decision: a federal court was now expected to review state court
decisions on constitutional issues and to relitigate questions of fact whenever
"there is some indication that the state process has not dealt fairly or com-
pletely with the issues." 126 Indeed, within a short time relitigation became the
118. Id. at 297.
119. Id. at 312.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 313.
122. Id. at 318.
123. Id. at 310.
124. Id. at 318.
125. Id. at 321.
126. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1122 (1970).
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order of the day in habeas cases. Townsend radically changed the character of
the habeas review function from a mere review of the state record to a manda-
tory duty in many situations to develop an independent record and redeter-
mine the primary facts. State criminal convictions were now subject to col-
lateral attack in the federal court on numerous constitutional issues.'2 7
On the day the Court announced Townsend, it also decided Fay v.
Noia, 128 which dealt with a petitioner's procedural default in the state courts.
The default issue was not especially important under Brown because Brown
had contemplated that, in the ordinary case, federal habeas corpus review
would be limited to the state record in the absence of a "vital flaw" in the
state fact-finding process. 129 Under Townsend, however, redetermination of
the facts relating to the constitutional issues that were decided in the state
court became the norm. But some prisoners, because of a state procedural
default, could not have their federal constitutional issues adjudicated in the
state court and, therefore, were barred from having the constitutional claims
heard by federal habeas courts by the rule of Brown's companion case,
Daniels v. Allen. '30 Fay v. Noia represented the Court's first effort to deal
with this problem since its landmark decision seventy-seven years earlier in
Ex parte Royall,131 which held that habeas petitioners challenging the consti-
tutionality of a state statute in the federal courts must first exhaust their state
court remedies.
In Fay v. Noia the state court had convicted the petitioner, Noia, of
murder solely on the basis of what he claimed was an involuntary confes-
sion. 32 After deliberately allowing the time for direct appeal to lapse, M Noia
sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.'34 On review the
narrow question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the State's
admitted use of an involuntary confession entitled Noia to postconviction
collateral relief despite his failure to seek review in the state courts. 35
Painting broadly, as it had in Townsend, the Court held that (1) the statute
gives federal courts the power to grant relief, despite the petitioner's failure to
pursue a state remedy no longer available at the time he applied for habeas;
the doctrine that a state procedural default constitutes an adequate and inde-
127. Several years after Townsend the Court held in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), that
primary factual determinations pertaining to alleged constitutional violations against federal prisoners could also
be collaterally attacked in federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to the same extent that they were subject to
attack under § 2254 for state prisoners. Id. at 221-31.
128. 372 U.S. 391 (1%3).
129. 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., separate majority opinion).
130. 344 U.S. 443, 486-87 (1953).
131. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
132. 372 U.S. 391, 394-96 (1963).
133. The prisoner intentionally did not appeal because of fear that a second trial might result in a death
sentence. Id. at 439-40. Noia's two codefendants had unsuccessfully appealed in the state court, but later
obtained their release under a federal writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the confessions had been
involuntary. Id. at 395.
134. Id. at 395-96.
135. Id. at 394.
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pendent state ground barring direct Supreme Court review is not to be ex-
tended to preclude federal habeas relief; (2) Noia's failure to appeal is not to
be deemed a failure to exhaust "'the remedies available in the courts of the
State' [under] § 2254" 136 because the possibility of appeal was no longer open
to him when he filed his habeas petition; and (3) under these circumstances
Noia's failure to appeal cannot be deemed an intelligent and understanding
waiver of his right to appeal sufficient to foreclose federal habeas relief. '37
The Court thus effectively overruled Daniels v. Allen, decided ten years
earlier, and concluded that Noia's deliberate decision not to bring a direct
appeal, though precluding further relief in the state courts, did not bar federal
habeas relief. 38 Finally, the Court articulated a "deliberate bypass" rule in an
attempt to shade the bright line it had painted. Under this rule a federal judge
"may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-
passed the orderly procedure of the state courts." 139 The waiver must, how-
ever, meet the standard of "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege" enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst.'40
As a result of Townsend and Nola, federal habeas corpus had, indeed,
acquired enormous flexibility and power. The habeas process now not only
provided collateral review of constitutional claims arising out of criminal
convictions in both the state and federal courts, but also transcended the
process available on direct review. Under Townsend a federal habeas court
could relitigate de novo primary factual questions if it was dissatisfied with
state court fact finding. Moreover, under Noia it had the extraordinary
authority to litigate issues that the petitioner had neglected under state law
through procedural error or by default, except when the applicant's conduct
amounted to a deliberate bypass under the Johnson v. Zerbst standard.
Beginning as a rivulet during the early Colonial days, the Great Writ had
now become a mighty river that served as a powerful force in the preservation
of personal liberties. It had originated as a means of collateral attack on the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court in circumstances in which the appeal
process was inadequate to protect the defendant's constitutional rights. As
the Court expanded its interpretation of due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment, '4' the writ's power and importance increased. The habeas
court now had the power to inquire into innumerable constitutional issues,
and it had also acquired an impressive review function and the power to
redetermine the primary facts. 4
2
136. Id. at 399.
137. Id. at 398-99.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 438.
140. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
141. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
142. Habeas corpus in the federal courts had thus come full circle. It originated as a means of collateral
attack in those circumstances in which the appeal process was not adequate to ensure the protection of
the constitutional rights involved. It then absorbed the review process in addition to its traditional role
of collateral attack. Finally, it was returned to the status of providing a vehicle for collateral attack,
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As Justice Tom Clark predicted in his dissent in Fay v. Noia,143 the
federal courts quickly felt the effect of both Townsend and Noia: a rash of
habeas corpus petitions soon inundated the federal judiciary.44 Reaction to
the broad scope of the rules laid down in those cases set in after several years.
The relitigation generated after Townsend affronted the dignity of state
judges, who resented the idea of a single federal judge reversing not only a
state trial judge but also the state appellate court. Relitigation also challenged
the integrity of the state fact-finding process. Fay v. Noia may have disturbed
state judges even more than Townsend because of its deliberate bypass rule
and its rejection of the well-established doctrine that a state procedural de-
fault which constitutes an adequate and independent state ground to bar direct
review also bars federal courts from granting habeas relief.
Congress responded to these problems in 1966 by limiting habeas review
of state factual determinations. It amended section 2254(d) of the 1948 habeas
statute 145 by providing that state court factual findings shall be presumed
correct unless one of eight specified conditions is met.'46
Townsend and Fay represent the watershed in federal habeas corpus
jurisprudence. They established important principles that, although severely
criticized, remained in effect for the next decade.
D. The Explosion in Crime and Lawlessness
In the mid-1960s the growth of violent crime became a matter of serious
national concern.147 A 1968 Gallup poll revealed that for the first time since
even on those issues where traditionally the appeal process had been sufficient to protect the constitu-
tional rights in question.
Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceed-
ings, 64 IOWA L. REV. 233, 246 (1979).
143. 372 U.S. 391, 445-46 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
144. In 1941, prior to Brown v. Allen, only 127 petitions were filed in federal court. Id. at 446 n.2. In 1962,
the year prior to Noia, 1408 petitions were filed. In 1970 the number had grown to 9063. See ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT-
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 1971, at 135 (1971).
145. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1976)).
146. The state court's factual findings are presumed correct unless it appears:
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full
and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the appellant
in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right,
failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceed-
ing;
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of
such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a con-
sideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
147. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 35-41 (1967).
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scientific polling began in the mid-1930s Americans viewed "crime and law-
lessness" as the country's most pressing domestic problem. ,4 The Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice-
which included Lewis F. Powell, soon to be appointed to the Supreme Court
of the United States-reported in 1967 that news concerning the growth of
crime across the nation had created "a sense of crisis in regard to the safety of
both person and property." 1
49
In response, Congress in 1968 enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, which substantially revised and strengthened the United
States Criminal Code.' 50 In the same year presidential candidate Richard M.
Nixon, taking note of the mood of the electorate, successfully campaigned on
a platform that primarily advocated law and order.' 5 1
E. The Ebb Tide
Within a short time after President Nixon assumed office, new faces
appeared on the Supreme Court. They joined others on the Court who had
lamented the sweeping expansion of federal habeas relief, had objected to
relitigation of state criminal trials, and had felt the need for finality of judg-
ment. Commencing in 1976 and continuing to the present, the Court has
announced a series of decisions limiting the availability of federal habeas
relief. Probably the most significant was the Court's decision in Stone v.
Powell 5 2 in 1976. But the result in that case had been foreshadowed several
years earlier by the concurrence of Justice Powell in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte. 15
Schneckloth concerned a consent search of a car stopped by officers for
traffic violations on a California highway. The State subsequently offered
evidence discovered in the car, which resulted in Bustamonte's conviction for
unlawful possession of a check with intent to defraud.'54 The United States
Supreme Court refused Bustamonte's request for relief. 55 In his concurrence
Justice Powell laid the groundwork for his historic opinion in Stone v. Powell.
He described the current state of the law permitting a federal or state prisoner
an opportunity to seek collateral review of search and seizure claims in
precisely the same manner as on direct appeal.' 56 He saw nothing in the
history and purpose of habeas corpus, "the desired prophylactic utility of the
exclusionary rule as applied to Fourth Amendment claims";' 57 nor did he see
any other sound reason to justify the application of federal habeas power to
148. A. ROGOW, THE DYING OF THE LIGHT 184 (1975).
149. PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 85 (1967).
150. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
151. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1968, at I, col. 3.
152. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
153. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
154. Id. at 220.
155. Id. at 249.
156. Id. at 251 (Powell, J., concurring).
157. Id.
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such claims. Justice Powell found some defense for the use of the writ only
when a prisoner raises a constitutional claim bearing on his innocence.'"
The Court imposed significant strictures on the writ in 1976 in Francis v.
Henderson 159 and Stone v. Powell.' 6 Although factually similar to the grand
jury issue in Brown v. Allen, Henderson actually raised the deliberate bypass
issue of Fay v. Noia. The petitioner challenged his 1965 Louisiana state court
conviction for murder on the ground that blacks had been unconstitutionally
excluded from the grand jury that indicted him. 161 Under state law such chal-
lenges to the composition of a grand jury were deemed waived if not made
prior to trial, and the prisoner had failed to timely object and to appeal in the
state courts. 162 He unsuccessfilly sought state collateral relief. The federal
district court granted a habeas writ for review of his federal constitutional
claim, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,' 63
relying on Davis v. United States,'64 a case concerning a federal prisoner.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals had
correctly applied the Davis rule to state prisoners seeking federal habeas
relief. 165 Davis had relied on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, which
requires that challenges to jury selection be made prior to trial and dictates
that failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver in absence of cause for granting
relief.'66 In Davis the Court had interposed an additional requirement for
relief, one that would receive prominent attention in future cases-a require-
ment of prejudice resulting from the constitutional deprivation.' 67
In Henderson the Court endorsed the Davis standards, resting its holding
on "considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice." 168 Although Fay v. Noia permitted state prisoners who had
failed to take advantage of state appellate review to obtain relief in federal
court unless they had deliberately bypassed state remedies, Francis v.
Henderson now required these petitioners to jump the hurdle of showing
cause and prejudice. 169 Thus, the Court in Henderson applied its first stricture
to the waiver rule of Fay v. Noia. Not only did the decision severely restrict
Noia, but as Justice Brennan charged in his dissent, the Court may have
undermined Noia sub silentio without actually reversing it.' 70 Consequently,
in Francis v. Henderson the Davis cause and prejudice standard became a
substantive part of the current law governing access to federal habeas corpus
158. Id. at 256-58.
159. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
160. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
161. 425 U.S. 536, 538 (1976).
162. Id. at 537-38.
163. Id. at 538.
164. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
165. 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976).
166. Id. at 539.
167. Id. at 542 n.6 (citing Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233,244-45 (1973)). But see 425 U.S. 536,551-52
n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976).
169. Id. at 542.
170. Id. at 545-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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review. The Court, however, offered no guidelines suggesting when comity
and federalism would require a federal court to defer to a state procedural
default rule that barred consideration of constitutional issues.
In Stone v. Powell,17 ' decided shortly afterward, the seeds that had ini-
tially been planted by Justice Black in Kaufman v. United States 72 grew to
fruition. The Court in Stone held that it would not grant habeas corpus relief
based on the controversial exclusionary rule it had originally adopted in
1914.'73 The question raised in Stone was whether a federal habeas court
should consider a state prisoner's petition claiming that the state trial court
had erroneously admitted evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure,
even though the state court had previously afforded him an opportunity for
full litigation of his constitutional claim.' 74
In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court noted that "the exclu-
sionary rule has long been the subject of sharp debate"' 75 and that the evi-
dence obtained from empirical research concerning its utility was still incon-
clusive. 176 The Court weighed the utility of the exclusionary rule against the
societal costs of extending it to collateral review of fourth amendment
claims. 7n The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule would apply at trial
and on direct appeal of state court convictions, but that it would not enforce
the rule in collateral proceedings because in that context its value was "out-
weighed by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system
of criminal justice." '78 The Court emphasized that fourth amendment claims
did not go to the merits-that is, to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Thus,
the Court held that when a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a fourth amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence introduced at trial
was obtained by an illegal search and seizure. 179
171. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
172. 394 U.S. 217, 231-42 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black, in dissent, forcefully expressed the
view that a claim under the fourth amendment for illegal search and seizure differed crucially from many other
constitutional rights. He saw the exclusionary rule as a procedural tool having no bearing on guilt and, therefore,
felt that it should be unavailable in habeas proceedings. Id. at 237-38.
173. 428 U.S. 465,494-95 (1976). The exclusionary rule was originally adopted in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
174. 428 U.S. 465, 469 (1976). The petitioner had been arrested by police for violation of a vagrancy statute.
In a search incident to the arrest, an officer had uncovered a gun. In his subsequent murder trial in state court,
the petitioner had unsuccessfully moved for suppression of the gun as evidence on the ground that the vagrancy
statute under which he had been arrested was unconstitutionally vauge. Id. at 469-70. If the statute were
unconstitutional, the arrest would be invalid, and any evidence obtained incident to that arrest would be
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The state appellate court
affirmed, and the federal district court denied the request for habeas relief. 428 U.S. 465, 470 (1976).
175. 428 U.S. 465, 492 n.32 (1976).
176. Id. at 492.
177. Id. at 489-94.
178. Id. at 494.
179. Id. Concurring, Chief Justice Burger felt that the exclusionary rule had been in force long enough to
demonstrate flaws and that it had produced bizarre miscarriages ofjustice. Id. at 496. Justice Brennan, dissent-
ing for himself and Justice Marshall, expressed apprehension
that the groundwork is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for
all grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, then at least for claims-for example, of double
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After Stone v. Powell search and seizure questions could be reviewed on
habeas only when the petitioner had been denied an opportunity for a full and
fair hearing in the state court. Stone represented a dramatic turnabout from
the days of Fay v. Noia: the Court was now severely contracting the federal
courts' power to hear federal habeas corpus claims arising out of a state's
failure to apply the exclusionary rule.
Whatever vitality remained in Fay v. Noia after Stone v. Powell was
drained away the following year in Wainwright v. Sykes. 80 In Sykes a state
prisoner convicted of murder brought a federal habeas petition challenging his
detention on the basis of Miranda v. Arizona. 8' Although the state trial court
had admitted into evidence inculpatory statements that he had previously
made to police officers, the petitioner had not objected that he had not under-
stood the Miranda warnings read to him. The trial judge had neither held a
fact-finding hearing nor questioned sua sponte the admissibility of the state-
ments. On appeal the prisoner did not challenge the inculpatory statements.
After unsuccessfully seeking relief in state collateral proceedings, he sought a
federal writ of habeas corpus. 
2
Both the federal district court and the court of appeals held that Jackson
v. Denno 83 required a state court hearing on the voluntariness of the state-
ments.' 84 The court of appeals also ruled that the petitioner's failure to comply
with Florida's procedural contemporaneous objection rule did not bar review
of the suppression claim in the habeas proceeding because the right to object
had not been deliberately bypassed. 185
Taking this opportunity to flesh out its decision in Francis v. Henderson
and thereby further limit the effect of Fay v. Noia, the Court addressed the
issue whether a default under a state's procedural rule barring state court
review of a claimed error under Miranda in admitting the prisoner's confes-
sion would also bar federal habeas review. The Court held that the Francis v.
Henderson rule, which bars federal habeas review of an alleged defect in the
selection of a grand jury absent a showing of cause and prejudice resulting
from a state procedural waiver, also applies to a waived objection to the
admission of a confession at trial. 186 The Court left open for future decisions
the precise definition of the cause and prejudice standard, but noted that it is
jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of invalid identification proce-
dures-that this Court later decides are not "guilt related."
Id. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
180. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
18 1. Id. at 74-75. In Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that statements made during a custodial
interrogation of an accused are inadmissible at trial unless the police first advise the suspect that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says will be used against him in court, that he has the right to consult with a
lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him. Id. at 467-73.
182. 433 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1977).
183. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
184. 433 U.S. 72, 75-76 (1977).
185. Id. at 76-77.
186. Id. at 87.
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narrower than the deliberate bypass standard set forth in Fay v. Noia.'87 The
Court also stated in unmistakable terms that it was rejecting the sweeping
language of Fay v. Noia and explained at length its reasons for doing so.'"s
Thus, the Court once again narrowed the scope of federal habeas relief by
expanding the independent, adequate state ground rule to bar habeas relief.
In 1982 the Supreme Court demonstrated in a trilogy of habeas corpus
cases its intention to further curb the availability of habeas relief in the federal
courts. The first of these, Rose v. Lundy, 89 extended the old and well-estab-
lished exhaustion rule of Ex parte Royall.' 9 In Lundy a state prisoner sought
federal habeas relief from his conviction for rape and other sexual offenses.
His federal petition included both claims that had been exhausted and claims
that had not been exhausted in the state courts.' 9' Justice O'Connor,' 9 writ-
ing for the Court, noted that the current habeas statute, 193 adopted in 1948,
does not address the problem of petitions containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims 194 and that the courts of appeals were divided on the issue
whether total exhaustion was required before federal review was possible. 95
For reasons of federal-state comity and judicial efficiency, the Court adopted
a rule requiring total exhaustion in the state courts of all claims set forth in the
petition before a federal district court may consider any of the habeas
claims-even those that had been exhausted.'96 Accordingly, upon filing a
petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the petitioner
must amend to delete the unexhausted claims or suffer dismissal of the peti-
tion. The majority of the Court could not agree whether claims deleted by




188. Id. at 87-90.
189. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
190. 117 U.S. 241 (1886). In Royall the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of habeas
corpus petition because the petitioner had not presented his constitutional claims to the state courts. See supra
text accompanying note 131.
191. 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).
192. Justice O'Connor had recently expressed her views on federal collateral review of state court convic-
tions in a law review article written while she was still a state court of appeals judge. O'Connor, Trends in the
Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts From the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 801 (1981).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) provides in part:
(b) An application for writ of habeas corpus in behalf of [a state prisoner] shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or
that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented.
194. 455 U.S. 509, 516-17 (1982).
195. Id. at 513 n.5.
196. Id. at 518-22. For a case illustrating some ramifications of this total exhaustion rule, see Williams v.
Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3 (Ist Cir. 1982).
197. 455 U.S. 509, 520-21 (1982).
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Justice Blackmun, concurring narrowly on a need to remand, disagreed
with the majority's new "Draconian" and "misguided" exhaustion rule.'93
He saw inconsistencies with previous holdings of the Court, such as Brown v.
Allen,'99 and aptly pointed to features of the rule that appeared to be destruc-
tive rather than supportive of federal-state comity. He saw nothing useful in
remitting a petitioner to a state court to exhaust a patently frivolous claim-
which the federal court was certain to reject-before the federal court could
consider a meritorious, exhausted ground for relief.200 He concluded that the
rule would be a trap for the unwary, would raise definitional problems pertain-
ing to total exhaustion, would delay the resolution of serious claims, and
would tend to increase rather than decrease the burden on both the state and
federal courts.20 ' Justice Stevens, in his dissent, also advanced cogent objec-
tions to the adoption of the total exhaustion rule.202
As the concurrence and the dissent point out, Lundy's total exhaustion
rule may not, in the final analysis, promote judicial efficiency or federal-state
comity. The rule may serve only to increase the workload for both state and
federal courts, create more paperwork and expense, and delay the final dis-
position of the proceedings. Lundy does, however, provide further notice of
the Supreme Court's hostility to state prisoner habeas petitions that do not
raise questions of fundamental fairness.
The second case of the 1982 trilogy was Engle v. Isaac.20 3 The State of
Ohio had indicted Isaac for murder, and Isaac had pleaded self-defense. The
trial judge instructed the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving
self-defense. The defendant did not object to the charge, and the jury found
him guilty. 204 While his appeal was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State
v. Robinson, °5 construing a 1974 revision to the Ohio criminal code, held that
a criminal defendant could not be required to bear the burden of proving
self-defense. 206 Nevertheless, the state appellate court denied relief to Isaac
because of his failure to preserve the error by objection, which the Ohio Rules
of Criminal Procedure require. 207 The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed
Isaac's appeal for want of substantial constitutional question.0 3
A United States district court subsequently denied Isaac habeas relief
198. Id. at 526-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
199. 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953).
200. 455 U.S. 509, 525 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 522, 530.
202. Id. at 538-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. 456 U.S. 107(1982). The opinion also disposes oftwo othercases, Perini v. Bell, 635 F.2d 575 (6thCir.
1980), and Engle v. Hughes, 642 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1980). The factual distinctions in the three cases are not
relevant to this discussion and reference is made only to the facts in Isaac. The legal issue is the same in all three
cases.
204. 456 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1982).
205. 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976).
206. The petitioner in Isaac had been tried and convicted after the effective date of the new criminal code
but before the decision in Robinson.
207. 456 U.S. 107, 115 (1982). See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 30.
208. Id. at 116.
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because his failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of his constitutional
claim and because he had not demonstrated cause or prejudice, which Sykes
requires. 209 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
reasoning that cause existed because Ohio's established practice would have
made any objection to the instruction futile, and that prejudice was clear
because the burden of proof was a critical element in the fact finding.10
The United States Supreme Court reversed. It first rejected the pris-
oner's argument that the cause and prejudice standard of Wainwright v. Sykes
should be limited to constitutional error not affecting the truth-finding func-
tion of the trial. Thus, even if the truth-finding process is challenged, under
Isaac "any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the federal courthouse
after a state procedural default must demonstrate cause and prejudice before
obtaining relief.- 21' The Supreme Court rejected the idea that the futility of
presenting an objection in the state court was a sufficient reason for failing to
object and, thus, could not accept the Court of Appeals' finding of adequate
cause. A defendant who perceives or has reason to know of a constitutional
claim must object properly and may not bypass the state court merely because
it may be unsympathetic. The Court explained that the cause and prejudice
standard "is more demanding than Fay's deliberate bypass requirement" and
that "perceived futility alone cannot constitute cause.", 213 Since it found no
cause, the Court did not consider the prejudice prong of the standard. 21 4
On the same day that the Court decided Engle v. Isaac, it also announced
its decision in United States v. Frady,2 5 the third case of the trilogy. Frady,
who had been convicted of first degree murder in 1963 by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, sought to have his sentence
vacated by a motion for federal collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He
claimed that the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury on the meaning
of malice and that the instruction had eliminated the possibility of a man-
slaughter verdict.2 6 The court denied the motion because Frady had failed to
challenge the instructions on direct appeal or, as required by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 30, in prior motions. 27 The court of appeals applied the
209. Id. For a discussion of the Sykes decision, see supra text accompanying notes 180-88.
210. 456 U.S. 107, 118 (1982).
211. Id. at 129.
212. Id. at 130.
213. Id. at 130 n.36.
214. See id. at 135. The Court was equally unsympathetic in rejecting the contention that at the time of trial
the defendants could not have known that Ohio's self-defense instructions raised constitutional questions. The
Court felt that the claims were "far from unknown" at the time of trial because In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970), decided more than four years earlier, had laid the basis for their constitutional claim. 456 U.S. 107, 131
(1982). Thus, the Court appeared to apply the cause and prejudice standard regardless of the nature of the
constitutional claims and suggested that "victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice" should have no
difficulty meeting that standard. Id. at 135.
215. 456 U.S. 107, 152 (1982).
216. Id. at 157-58.
217. Id. at 158. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o party may assign as error any
portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection."
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plain error standard of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which
governs relief on direct appeal for errors not objected to at trial, rather than
the cause and prejudice standard of Sykes, and reversed.18
Formulating the issue to be whether the same standard of review applies
both to collateral challenge and to challenge on direct review to a criminal
conviction by a federal prisoner under section 2255, the Court concluded that
federal prisoners, like state prisoners, should surmount "significantly higher
hurdle[s]" to obtain relief in a collateral proceeding. 2'9 The Court therefore
applied the cause and prejudice standard. It found unnecessary any inquiry
whether cause existed, because it was confident that Frady had not suffered
"actual prejudice of a degree sufficient to justify collateral relief nineteen
years after his crime.-
220
Thus, with the 1982 trilogy of cases the Supreme Court significantly
contracted the availability of federal habeas corpus relief. The collateral relief
principles it had formulated in the previous decade would be applied to both
federal and state prisoners. Persons seeking relief on habeas corpus would be
subject to a significantly higher standard of review than would those bringing
a direct appeal. Procedural defaults at the trial level could be overcome on
collateral attack only after the habeas petitioner had met the cause and preju-
dice standard of Sykes. The progressive expression of antipathy to collateral
relief by the Court in these opinions is evident.22' It is most evident in Engle v.
Isaac, in which Justice O'Connor observed that "[l]iberal allowance of the
writ, moreover, degrades the prominence of the trial itself." 222 The Constitu-
tion and laws, she noted, afford the accused a multitude of protections at
trial.223
It appears that the polestar of habeas corpus relief for the present Court is
whether an application is based on a fundamental miscarriage of justice. It
remains to be seen whether the Court has in the past decade erected hurdles
of such dimension that they substantially impede all serious efforts to estab-
lish a miscarriage of justice. In his dissent in Rose v. Lundy, Justice Stevens
pointed to specific examples of fundamental trial errors that would justify
collateral relief regardless of the passage of time and of the failure to properly
preserve objections to error in the original trial. 224 He likewise observed in his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Engle v. Isaac that the Court's pre-
occupation with procedural default hurdles, regardless of the type of claim, is
more likely to complicate than to simplify the habeas process for federal
judges.22S
218. 456 U.S. 152, 158-59 (1982).
219. Id. at 166.
220. Id. at 168.
221. In his dissent in Engle v. Isaac, Justice Brennan described the antipathy as "'unvarnished hostility.*
456 U.S. 107, 148 (1982).
222. 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982).
223. Id.
224. 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. 456 U.S. 107, 136 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Brennan also expressed his disapproval in Engle v. Isaac of
habeas procedure so restrictive that it denies relief for constitutional errors
that affect the truth-finding function of the trial. He saw no virtue in sparing
the accused the ordeal of a retrial that the accused himself had requested, or
in ensuring the finality of a conviction arguably tainted by constitutional
errors that affected the truth-finding process at trial. 2 6 He believed the faulty
allocation of the burden of proof on the accused constituted "a denial of due
process of intolerable proportions.- 227 He also rejected the Court's analysis
in Frady. Instead of giving federal prisoners a nonpreferred status, Justice
Brennan protested, rejection of the plain error rule on collateral review left
federal prisoners bound "more tightly than their state counterparts" to the
Court's procedural barriers because state courts may still be able to grant
state prisoners the benefit of the plain error rule in state collateral review. 228
V. CONCLUSION
On September 2, 1942, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia decided Ex parte Rosier2 9 a habeas case undistinguished in legal
history. The case dealt with an indigent and friendless prisoner committed to
St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. who had unsuccessfully sought
leave to file his own holographic habeas petition in forma pauperis in federal
district court. The district court also denied his right to appeal in forma
pauperis, but the court of appeals, upon application by the prisoner, directed
the clerk of the district court to file the appeal nunc pro tunc and appointed
counsel to protect the prisoner's rights on appeal.2 0 Upon hearing the appeal
the court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the prisoner had
alleged facts entitling him to a hearing on the petition and the appointment of
counsel in the district court.23
The appellate court's careful review of this poor, helpless petitioner's
case and its sensitive protection of his rights, including a direction to file his
petition and appeal without prepayment of costs, attracted the attention of A.
H. Colcord. Editorializing on the case in Current History, he observed:
[The] desire for freedom and for security from oppression seems instinctive in
man. It cannot be permanently frozen into an unalterable body of law or static
code for, as social or economic conditions create new and inescapable pressures,
old barriers must be widened and new bulwarks erected. That these rights are in
harmony with what may be called "natural justice" and spring from it, gives them
their great and irresistible power.
23 2
The passage of forty years since this article was published in 1943 has not
226. Id. at 146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 150.
228. 456 U.S. 152, 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229. 133 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
230. Id. at 316.
231. Id. at 332-33.
232. Colcord, Civil Rights and Freedom, 4 CURRENT HIST. 32, 34 (1943).
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eroded but reinforced the substance of Colcord's thoughtful message. The
history of the Great Writ, especially during the flood tide in the years follow-
ing Ex parte Rosier, demonstrates that federal habeas corpus law, concerned
as it is with deprivation of fundamental liberties, has not been "permanently
frozen into an unalterable body of law or static code. ' ' 23
The long and generally progressive course of the federal writ, the en-
largement of its remedies, and, in the past decade, the constriction of these
remedies, may not be attributed solely to the judicial application of legal
principles to important constitutional issues. The forward motion of habeas
corpus law, and its fluctuations, reflect the inescapable societal pressures that
have broken down rigid traditional jurisdictional barriers and given the writ
dynamic qualities.
Despite considerable public misconception to the contrary, congressional
legislation-not judicial activism-first energized and broadened the writ,
thus enabling the federal courts to meet the problems of a complex, growing,
and pluralistic society that included substantial racial minorities. Reacting to
the needs of a post-Civil War society, the Congress in 1867 made federal
habeas corpus applicable to state prisoners and relaxed procedural restraints.
In Brown v. Allen the Supreme Court took a giant step toward making the
aspirations of the Congress of 1867 a reality.
Looking back after almost two decades, the rules announced in
Townsend v. Sain and Fay v. Noia broadening the scope of the writ may now
seem extreme to some, but they may, nonetheless, have served a useful and
important purpose when they were announced. The new rules helped imple-
ment a widely heralded civil rights movement that had begun in the early
1950s to arouse once more the conscience of America. The frustrations
engendered by widespread disregard of civil rights almost a century after the
Emancipation and the inability of black defendants to obtain a fair trial in
many parts of the country focused the attention of a sensitive Supreme Court
on a definite need for legal reform and for a more expansive rule for collateral
review of state criminal convictions. Townsend v. Sain and Fay v. Noia
appear to have been a response to perceived social and legal needs of the
time.
The strictures applied to the writ during the past decade have often been
ascribed to federalism, comity, and the need for finality of judgment. But
federalism and comity are not of recent vintage; they blossomed in the early
years of the nation and have enjoyed a lively history ever since. The reasons
underlying recent constriction of the writ may contain some elements of
comity, federalism, and finality of judgment, but social and legal develop-
ments have added other ingredients to the mix. These include the almost
uncontrollable torrent of prisoner and other habeas cases flowing into the
233. Id.
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federal courts each year and the growing concern with the upsurge in violent
crime. Repetitive and costly trials and seemingly endless litigation over a
single criminal case have aroused impatience and indignation. The present
Supreme Court may have concluded that changing concerns, a society fright-
ened by growing lawlessness and crimes of violence, and an overworked
judiciary necessitate stringent limitations of the writ. Only habeas petitions
convincingly setting forth fundamental miscarriages of justice will be con-
sidered. And we can probably expect that for the remainder of the century the
course of collateral review will continue to move restrictively and slowly.
Nonetheless, almost two hundred years after Congress first provided for
habeas corpus relief in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Great Writ continues
today to hold a venerable and vibrant role in our jurisprudence. Despite the
diminished availability of the writ, it still has considerable vitality. Essen-
tially, it remains the bulwark of our personal liberties, far stronger than it was
in the day when Edward Bushell used it to obtain his freedom from the
Crown.

